No Secrets Allowed: A Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Evidence by Scott, Abigail B.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 61 
Issue 3 Spring 2012 Article 7 
2012 
No Secrets Allowed: A Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose 
Inadmissible Evidence 
Abigail B. Scott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abigail B. Scott, No Secrets Allowed: A Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Evidence, 61 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 867 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol61/iss3/7 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
No Secrets Allowed: A Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Evidence 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2006, 
Boston College. The author would like to thank Professor Mary G. Leary for her wisdom and insight and 
the members of the Catholic University Law Review for their time and effort spent working on this 
Comment. The author also wishes to thank her parents, Bill and Gail Scott, her sister, Julia Scott, her 
brother, Will Scott, and her wonderful friends for their continued love, support, and encouragement. 
This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol61/iss3/7 
  867
NO SECRETS ALLOWED: A PROSECUTOR’S 
OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE 
Abigail B. Scott+ 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn resigned as managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund after he was indicted on sexual assault charges.1  After an 
extensive post-indictment investigation, the New York District Attorney’s 
office determined that the complaining witness lacked creditability due to 
inconsistent statements she made regarding the alleged attack by  
Strauss-Kahn.2   When prosecutors from the New York District Attorney’s 
office discovered the complainant’s inconsistent and allegedly false statements, 
they informed Strauss-Kahn’s defense counsel of this information in 
accordance with Brady v. Maryland.3   Although the prosecutors moved to 
dismiss the indictment,4 the events leading to dismissal of Strauss-Kahn’s case 
underscore a critical aspect of criminal procedure: a defendant’s limited “right” 
to discovery based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 5   These constitutional amendments establish prosecutorial 
                                                 
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2006, Boston College.  The author would like to thank Professor Mary G. Leary for her 
wisdom and insight and the members of the Catholic University Law Review for their time and 
effort spent working on this Comment.  The author also wishes to thank her parents, Bill and Gail 
Scott, her sister, Julia Scott, her brother, Will Scott, and her wonderful friends for their continued 
love, support, and encouragement. 
 1. John Eligon, Judge Grants Bail to Strauss-Kahn; Prosecutors Announce an Indictment, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at B1, B9. 
 2. Recommendations for Dismissal at 1–2, State v. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, No. 
02526/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011).  The prosecutor discovered that the complainant’s 
asylum application contained an allegation of gang rape in her home country of Guinea, Africa, 
which she admitted was false to prosecutors during interviews.  Id. at 14.  The prosecution also 
questioned the complainant’s financial motive after listening to her recorded conversations with 
her fiancé regarding the case’s potential for financial recovery, even though she had told 
prosecutors that she had “no interest in obtaining money as a result of her involvement in the 
case.”  Id. at 17.  Additionally, she conceded involvement in an unrelated tax-fraud scheme.  
Letter from Joan Illuzzi-Orbon and John McConnell, Assistant Dist. Attorneys, to Benjamin 
Brafman and William W. Taylor, III, Def. Counsel at 2 (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://asset.rule89.com/file/DSK.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Illuzzi-Orbon and McConnell]. 
 3. Letter from Illuzzi-Orbon and McConnell, supra note 2, at 1–3; see also Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–90 (1963) (holding that prosecutors violate a defendant’s due-process 
rights when suppressing requested material evidence). 
 4. Recommendation for Dismissal, supra note 2, at 11. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Supreme Court has held that, 
although Brady gives a defendant access to requested discovery, it does not create a “general 
constitutional right to discovery.”  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); see also 
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obligations of pre-trial disclosure in criminal cases, and raise questions 
concerning disclosure of potentially inadmissible evidence. 
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that, upon request of the defendant, a 
prosecutor must disclose to defense counsel any admissible exculpatory 
evidence that is favorable to the defendant.6   Favorable evidence includes 
evidence that is “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor.”7  The Court later expanded Brady 
and determined that prosecutors must disclose all evidence that tends to 
demonstrate the defendant’s innocence, regardless of whether the defense has 
made a specific request for such information. 8   A prosecutor’s failure to 
disclose admissible exculpatory evidence violates a defendant’s due-process 
right to a fair trial and entitles the defendant to a new trial.9 
Only one Supreme Court case has specifically addressed prosecutorial 
disclosure obligations of inadmissible evidence.10  In Wood v. Bartholomew, 
the Court held that no Brady violation occurred when prosecutors withheld 
from defense counsel a witness’s failed polygraph, which was inadmissible 
under state law.11  The Court found that the prosecution was not obligated to 
disclose the inadmissible evidence because the evidence was not “material,” 
                                                                                                                 
Discovery and Access to Evidence, 39 GEO. L.J. (ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.) 356, 356–57 (2010) 
(noting disclosure obligations of the government are grounded in the Constitution). 
 6. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 7. Id.  Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory evidence, which “tends to negate 
guilt, diminish culpability, support an affirmative defense . . . [or] reduce the severity of the 
sentence imposed,” and impeachment evidence, which includes a wide array of evidence that 
“would expose weaknesses in the government’s case or cast doubt on the credibility of 
government witnesses.”  Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and 
the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 423–25 (2010) (footnote 
omitted). 
 8. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“[T]here are situations in which 
evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it 
to be disclosed even without a specific request.”); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,  
421–22 (1995) (placing the burden on the prosecution to determine whether evidence is 
reasonably probable to determine guilt); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) 
(explaining that evidence must be disclosed if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure 
would have resulted in a different outcome).  In order to bring a Brady claim, a defendant must 
establish that: (1) the contested evidence was favorable to the defendant, based either on its 
exculpatory or impeaching nature; (2) the prosecutor inadvertently or willfully suppressed the 
contested evidence; and (3) the suppression prejudiced the  defendant.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281–81 (1999). 
 9. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421–22 (holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial due 
to the prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 443 
(noting that when a Brady violation is discovered post-trial the typical remedy is a new trial, but 
if the violation is discovered during the trial, possible remedies include disclosure of the evidence 
and a continuance, giving defense counsel a chance to review the evidence). 
 10. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 2 (1995). 
 11. Id. at 6, 8. 
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and would not have affected the outcome of trial. 12  The Court applied a 
“reasonable probability” analysis to determine if the evidence was material, 
noting that evidence is material “only where there exists a ‘reasonable 
probability’ that had the evidence been disclosed [to the defense] the result at 
trial would have been different.”13 
Circuit courts have reached divergent conclusions when applying Brady and 
Wood to determine whether prosecutors are obligated to disclose inadmissible 
evidence to defendants.14  The Fourth Circuit found that inadmissible evidence 
is outside the scope of Brady because evidence that cannot be introduced at 
trial cannot be material.15  In contrast, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits have found that inadmissible evidence may be within the scope 
of Brady and have required prosecutors to disclose inadmissible evidence that 
could lead to exculpatory, admissible evidence in certain circumstances.16  The 
Fifth Circuit has diverged slightly from the rest of these courts and has focused 
its Brady analysis on whether the inadmissible evidence, if disclosed, could 
create a reasonable probability of a different trial result.17   
This Comment examines the differing approaches to prosecutorial 
nondisclosure of inadmissible exculpatory and impeachment evidence.  First, 
this Comment discusses the full spectrum of evidence that must be disclosed 
under Brady and its progeny.  Next, this Comment examines the Wood 
standard for disclosure of inadmissible exculpatory evidence.  The Comment 
then explores the existing circuit split, and analyzes whether inadmissible 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence requires obligatory disclosure by the 
                                                 
 12. Id. at 5–6, 8. 
 13. Id. at 5–6 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433–34; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).  In other words, 
under the “reasonable probability” test, a defendant must demonstrate that the likelihood of a 
different result is so high as to undermine the trial outcome.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. 
 14. See infra Part I.D. 
 15. See Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a victim’s 
prior consensual sexual acts were not material because they could not have changed the 
judgment). 
 16. Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308, 325 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering inadmissible hearsay 
evidence when determining if a Brady violation occurred, and ultimately holding that the habeas 
petitioner was not prejudiced because he failed to establish that the inadmissible evidence could 
have led to the discovery of admissible material evidence), reh’g denied, No. 07-4479, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 18549 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2011); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(discussing the underlying policy of Brady and noting that “evidence itself inadmissible could be 
so promising a lead to strong exculpatory evidence that there could be no justification for 
withholding it”); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 567 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing a similar 
theory); Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that alleged impeachment 
evidence was immaterial because it would not have changed the trial’s outcome); United States v. 
Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding inadmissible hearsay immaterial under 
Brady), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc), rev’d, 516 U.S. 137 (1994), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006). 
 17. United States v. Lee, 88 F. App’x 682, 685 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that Brady may 
require disclosure of inadmissible evidence if disclosure would create a reasonable probability of 
a different outcome at trial). 
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prosecution.  Finally, this Comment argues that the underlying policy of Brady 
and the dicta in Wood require disclosure of inadmissible evidence that does, or 
has a strong tendency to, lead to admissible exculpatory evidence, which 
creates a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.  
I.  REQUIRED BRADY DISCLOSURES: EXCULPATORY AND IMPEACHMENT 
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT 
A.  Brady and Agurs: Requiring Disclosure of Evidence That Tends to 
Undermine Proof of Guilt 
Brady v. Maryland is the landmark Supreme Court case mandating 
prosecutors disclose favorable evidence to the defense.18  In Brady, John Brady 
and co-defendant, Charles Boblit, received death sentences after they were 
found guilty of first-degree murder committed during a robbery.19  In Brady’s 
separate criminal trial, he admitted involvement in the robbery, but blamed 
Boblit for the murder in hopes of avoiding the death penalty.20  Before trial, 
Brady’s attorney requested copies of prior statements Boblit made to police.21  
Although the prosecution disclosed several statements, prosecutors did not 
release a statement in which Boblit admitted to the homicide until after 
Brady’s conviction was affirmed on appeal.22   
Brady moved for a new trial after discovering the undisclosed statement, 
which the trial court denied.23  The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
denial without prejudice. 24  The trial court subsequently dismissed Brady’s 
petition for post-conviction relief, but on appeal, the appellate court held that 
Boblit’s undisclosed statement violated Brady’s due-process rights. 25  
However, the appellate court remanded the case, restricting a new trial to the 
question of punishment only.26  
                                                 
 18. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 19. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84–85.  In Maryland, a homicide committed during the course of a 
felony, such as robbery, is considered first-degree murder.  Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 168 
(Md. 1961), aff’d, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 20. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84 (noting that Brady’s counsel asked the jury to return a “verdict 
‘without capital punishment’”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  Brady’s counsel received some statements in which Boblit alleged that Brady 
murdered the victim.  Brady, 174 A.2d at 169.  The State attempted to introduce the undisclosed 
evidence, in which Boblit admitted to the murder during his trial, but the trial court excluded the 
evidence because Boblit had not signed the statement.  Id. 
 23. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Brady, 174 A.2d at 170. 
 26. Id. at 171–72 (noting that the undisclosed evidence would have given Brady an 
argument for a lighter sentence, but a retrial would be moot because “nothing in [the undisclosed 
evidence] could have reduced . . . Brady’s offense below murder in the first degree”). 
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Brady appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing against the appellate court’s 
denial of a new trial to determine guilt.27  The Supreme Court held that Brady’s 
constitutional rights were not violated by the appellate court’s decision to limit 
the rehearing to the issue of punishment.28  However, the Court found that the 
prosecutors violated Brady’s due-process rights when they did not disclose 
Boblit’s confession.29  Thus, the Court held that prosecutors must disclose 
requested material evidence that either exculpates the defendant or reduces the 
defendant’s penalty.30  
The Court clarified prosecutorial disclosure obligations in United States v. 
Agurs.31  In this case, the trial court found Linda Agurs guilty of murder.32  
After the trial, Agurs discovered that prosecutors withheld the victim’s prior 
criminal record, which included evidence that could have demonstrated the 
victim’s violent character.33  In light of this belated discovery, Agurs moved 
for a new trial.34  In opposing the motion, the government argued that they did 
not have a duty to disclose the record absent a specific request and noted that 
the evidence was not material.35  Although the district court denied Agurs’ 
                                                 
 27. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 28. Id. at 88–92. 
 29. Id. at 86–87 (noting that deprivation of due process runs counter to the underlying 
societal goals of convicting the guilty while also ensuring defendants receive fair treatment and a 
fair trial).  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “state [shall] 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1, cl. 2.  Due-Process procedural rights entitle a defendant to a fair trial, which is violated 
when the government deprives a defendant of liberty “without adequate procedures.”  See Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he state may not execute, 
imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him a fair trial.”); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 
S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (per curiam) (explaining that due process is implicated when an individual 
has been deprived of liberty or property and when state procedures are not “constitutionally 
sufficient”); United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Due 
Process Clause protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial regardless of the government’s intent to 
diminish that right). 
 30. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88.  In Brady, the undisclosed evidence, which implicated 
another in the murder, was material to punishment because it was directly favorable to Brady.  2 
JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144 (4th ed. 
2006).  The Court also explained that its decision was not meant to punish the public for a 
prosecutor’s wrongs, but to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
 31. 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
 32. Id. at 98.  The victim, James Sewell, died from multiple stab wounds inflicted by Agurs 
after an alleged sexual encounter between the two in a motel room.  Id.  When motel workers 
entered the room in response to screams for assistance, Sewell was struggling to gain control of 
the knife that Agurs held.  Id. at 99. 
 33. Id. at 100.  Agurs claimed that she acted in self-defense and did not present any 
evidence at trial.  Id.  Because Agurs made a self-defense claim, outside evidence indicative of 
the victim’s violent character was relevant to corroborate her defense and was admissible 
evidence in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia at that time.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 100–01. 
 35. Id. at 101–02. 
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motion,36 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed, finding that the evidence was material based on the likelihood that it 
may have led the jury to reach a different verdict.37  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence of the victim’s 
violent character was not material because it did not create reasonable doubt as 
to Agurs’ guilt.38  Thus, failure to disclose the evidence did not violate Agurs’ 
due-process right to a fair trial. 39   Nevertheless, the Court noted that 
prosecutors are obligated to disclose exculpatory evidence absent a specific 
request, when the evidence is of “such substantial value to the defense that 
elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific 
request.”40 
B.  The Supreme Court Articulates the Result-Affecting Test: Requiring 
Disclosure of Evidence that Creates a Reasonable Probability of a Different 
Result 
After Agurs, the Court further modified the appropriate standard for 
materiality in United States v. Bagley. 41   In Bagley, Respondent Hughes 
Bagley, who was indicted for violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes, 
made specific pre-trial requests for information regarding deals prosecutors 
made with their witnesses.42  The government did not disclose the requested 
materials, and subsequently, Bagley was convicted on the narcotics charges.43  
A few years after his conviction, Bagley submitted requests for information to 
a government enforcement agency that employed the two key prosecution 
witnesses.44  In response, Bagley received copies of previously undisclosed 
contracts, which indicated that two officers provided testimony on the 
                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) 
(noting that Sewell’s prior conviction of “knife-related offenses would have constituted 
undeniable evidence” that he was prone to using and having knives). 
 38. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 102.  The standard applied by the Court in Agurs requires reviewing 
courts to examine the full trial record and assess whether the suppressed evidence creates “a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” 6 CRIM. PROC. § 24.3(b) (3d ed. 2010). 
 39. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 102, 114 (noting that the D.C. Circuit did not properly interpret  
due-process guarantees). 
 40. Id. at 106–07 (“[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not 
otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.”).  The Court outlined three scenarios in 
which Brady evidence arises: (1) when the defendant’s conviction is based on perjured testimony; 
(2) when defense counsel makes a specific pre-trial request for material evidence; and (3) when 
defense counsel makes either a general Brady request or no request at all.  Id. at 103–04, 107.  In 
all instances, the Court found that prosecutors must disclose the exculpatory evidence.  Id. at 110. 
 41. 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
 42. Id. at 669–70. 
 43. Id. at 670–71. 
 44. Id. at 671 (noting that the requests were made under the Freedom of Information Act 
and the Privacy Act of 1974). 
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government’s behalf in exchange for compensation. 45   This arrangement, 
which was contingent on a satisfactory result by the government, “served only 
to strengthen any incentive to testify falsely in order to secure a conviction.”46  
Bagley moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that nondisclosure of this deal 
violated Brady disclosure obligations.47  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Brady violations existed, and found that 
Brady applies to exculpatory and impeachment evidence. 48   However, the 
Court held that the evidence in this case was not necessarily material and 
remanded to determine whether there was “a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.” 49  The Court explained that this inquiry applies to all 
Brady materiality questions, and defined “reasonable probability” as “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome [of trial].”50  
Ten years later, in Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court again addressed 
materiality and disclosure requirements under Brady.51  In Kyles, Curtis Kyles 
                                                 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 671–72.  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington found 
that disclosure of the contracts during Bagley’s trial would not have affected the finding of 
Bagley’s guilt.  Id. at 673.  The court reasoned that the testimony of both witnesses primarily 
involved the firearms charges, of which Bagley was acquitted.  Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that the failure to disclose specifically requested Brady 
information that could have been used to impeach the witnesses violated Bagley’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses on cross-examination.  Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 
1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).  A 
defendant’s right to confront a witness under the Confrontation Clause also included the right to 
cross-examine a witness.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”); Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (noting the 
ability to cross-examine a witness is a highly effective tool to elicit the truth and allow a jury to 
evaluate witness credibility). 
 48. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (“The Court has rejected any . . . distinction between 
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”). 
 49. Id. at 682.  Despite the Court’s efforts to clarify “materiality,” the standard articulated in 
Bagley has led to confusion as some courts use the standard as the basis for reversal while others 
use the standard to define the contours of prosecutors’ pre-trial duty to disclose evidence.  Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (2011). 
 50. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also J. Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the Arkansas Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 
573–74 (2011) (explaining that the Court in Bagley created a single test for evaluating materiality 
instead of the three scenarios presented in Agurs).  A minority of states have adopted more 
favorable standards for defendants in “specific request” cases because of, in part, a belief that 
defendants are more prejudiced by negative responses to a request.  2 DRESSLER, supra note 30, 
at 148.  The most common of these relaxed standards is “‘a reasonable possibility’ that the result 
would have been different.”  Id. 
 51. 514 U.S. 419, 432–34 (1995).  In outlining the scope of Brady responsibilities, the Court 
articulated that prosecutors have a dual role; they are not only “an advocate,” but also a 
“representative of the sovereign,” which must be balanced with disclosure obligations.  
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was indicted for first-degree murder52 and specifically requested exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence before trial. 53   At the time of the request, the 
prosecutors did not possess exculpatory or impeachment evidence, but were 
aware that some police officers involved in the investigation did. 54  
Nevertheless, the prosecutors told defense counsel that exculpatory evidence 
did not exist.55  
The defense discovered the evidence after direct appeal. 56   Kyles 
subsequently sought habeas relief, claiming that his Brady rights were violated 
because the withheld evidence was material.57  The Supreme Court analyzed 
Kyles’ complaint using the Bagley standard for materiality, and examined the 
claim in the context of all the evidence presented at trial.58  The Court found 
that prosecutorial disclosure obligations included a requirement to “learn of 
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf 
in the case, including the police.”59  Thus, the Kyles Court added another 
prosecutorial duty, and held that a prosecutor’s failure to learn of all favorable 
evidence may result in a Brady violation.60  Applying this duty to the facts 
                                                                                                                 
Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the 
Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1793 (2007). 
 52. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 428.  Victim Dolores Dye was shot to death after being attacked 
outside of a grocery store in New Orleans, Louisiana.  Id. at 423.  The shooter stole Dye’s car.  Id.  
Police questioned six eyewitnesses at the scene who provided varying details regarding the 
perpetrator.  Id.  Police also gathered the license plate numbers of vehicles parked nearby, as they 
suspected the shooter may have left his car near the grocery store.  Id.  Some time after, an 
informant contacted the police and implicated Kyles, which led to Kyles’ arrest.  Id. at 426–27. 
 53. Id. at 428. 
 54. Id. at 428–29. 
 55. Id. at 428. 
 56. Id. at 431. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 433–38.  The Court noted four main points regarding materiality: (1) materiality is 
determined based on the “‘reasonable probability’ of a different result;” (2) favorable evidence is 
evidence that, when considered within the context of all evidence presented at trial, undermined 
the trial verdict; (3) if a reviewing court finds constitutional error in examining a claim of Brady 
violation, harmless-error review is not required; and (4) materiality is a collective consideration.  
Id. at 434–37.  On this fourth point, the Court noted that the Brady duty is a lower standard than 
the one imposed by the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.  Id. at 437 (quoting ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION  
§ 3-3.11(a) (1993)) (noting that prosecutors “should not intentionally fail to make timely 
disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or 
information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or 
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused”). 
 59. Id. at 437.  The Court emphasized that requiring the prosecution to learn of favorable 
evidence was consistent with Brady’s goal to encourage disclosure and ensure fair trials.  Id. at 
439. 
 60. Id. at 437–38 (noting that the government alone knows whether evidence has been 
provided to defense counsel, and therefore must be charged with determining the effect of the 
disclosure on the defendant’s case); see also Discovery and Access to Evidence, supra note 5, at 
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before it, the Court concluded that a Brady violation had occurred because the 
prosecutors failed to disclose known evidence, and that disclosure of the 
evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different trial 
outcome.61  
Shortly after Kyles, the Supreme Court decided Strickler v. Greene, which 
involved the abduction, robbery, and murder of Leanne Whitlock.62  During 
proceedings, a key government witness testified in “vivid detail” about the 
abduction and stated that she had an exceptional memory.63  Strickler was 
found guilty of abduction, robbery, and capital murder and received the death 
sentence.64  He subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition, and as a 
result, the federal district court permitted Strickler’s counsel to review all 
police and prosecution files in the case.65  Upon review of the files, Strickler’s 
counsel discovered conflicting recollections by the key witness.66  The district 
court granted Strickler’s writ, holding that the undisclosed evidence “was 
sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.”67  The 
Court of Appeals reversed, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.68  
The Supreme Court held that no Brady violation occurred because Strickler 
failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material or prejudicial.69  After 
examining the full trial record, the Court found Strickler’s guilt was 
corroborated by significant forensic and physical evidence, as well as other 
eyewitness testimony. 70   Further, the Court found that disclosure of the 
evidence would not have changed Strickler’s death sentence because the key 
                                                                                                                 
362–63 (explaining that prosecutors have a Brady obligation to affirmatively learn and disclose 
any “exculpatory or impeachment evidence known to other government agents”). 
 61. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441.  Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court holding and 
remanded the case.   Id. at 453–54.    
 62. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
 63. Id. at 266. 
 64. Id. at 276–77. 
 65. Id. at 278.  Strickler first filed an unsucessful state habeas petition, in which he argued 
that his trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to file a Brady motion to require disclosure of 
all known exculpatory evidence.  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 279. 
 68. Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420, at *9–10 (4th Cir. June 17, 
1998) (vacating in part because the claim was procedurally defaulted and because Strickler could 
not establish prejudice as the undisclosed evidence would have provided “little or no help . . . in 
either the guilt or sentencing phases of the trial”). 
 69. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82, 296 (“There are three components of a true Brady 
violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 
or because it is impeaching; that evidence must be suppressed by the [prosecution], either 
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”); see Elizabeth C. Hernandez & 
Jason M. Ferguson, The Brady Bunch: An Examination of Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian 
Federal and Military Justice Systems, 67 A.F. L. REV. 187, 194 (2011) (noting that Strickler 
provides a straight-forward application of Brady by annoucing a three-part test of materiality). 
 70. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 293–94. 
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witness’s testimony was unrelated to his death-sentence eligibility.71  In sum, 
the Court found there was no reasonable probability of a different verdict or 
sentence at trial, even if the key witness’s testimony had been impeached or 
excluded.72 
C.  Prosecutorial Disclosure Requirements of Inadmissible Evidence  
Among the Supreme Court cases that followed Brady, only Wood v. 
Bartholomew specifically addressed prosecutorial disclosure requirements for 
inadmissible evidence.73  In Wood, Dwayne Bartholomew admitted to robbing 
a laundromat and firing two gunshots—one of which killed a laundromat 
attendant. 74   Bartholomew, however, argued that the murder was not 
premeditated and claimed that the gun accidentally discharged the two 
bullets.75  At trial, prosecutors presented two witnesses who testified against 
Bartholomew.76  Before trial, both witnesses submitted to polygraph exams 
and gave answers consistent with their trial testimony.77  Their answers to 
questions regarding their involvement in the robbery were “inconclusive” and 
“indicated deception.” 78   The state did not disclose these results to 
Bartholomew.79  He was subsequently found guilty, and sentenced to life in 
prison without parole.80 
                                                 
 71. Id. at 295. 
 72. Id. at 295–96. 
 73. 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (per curium).  But see Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 n.7 
(5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Wood did not “squarely” articulate a rule for Brady disclosure 
obligations where the evidence at issue was inadmissible). 
 74. Wood, 516 U.S. at 2. 
 75. Id. at 2–3.  Premeditation was relevant at trial to determine whether Bartholomew 
committed felony murder—which did not require proof of premeditation—or aggravated murder 
in the first degree, which required such proof.  Id. at 3. 
 76. Id. at 3–4 (noting that Bartholomew’s brother and his brother’s girlfriend served as the 
two prosecution witnesses and gave testimony that indicated premeditation). 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Id.  Bartholomew’s brother’s results “indicated deception” when he responded to 
questions concerning whether he helped with the robbery and whether he was ever in the room 
where the homicide took place.  Id.  The results of Bartholomew’s brother’s girlfriend were 
inconclusive when she responded to whether she assisted with the robbery or handled the gun.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 9.  Bartholomew exhausted state remedies challenging the suppression and then 
filed for habeas relief in federal district court.  Id. at 4–5.  The district court denied 
Bartholomew’s request and found that he failed to show a reasonable likelihood of a different 
verdict with the polygraph evidence.  Id. at 5. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and held 
that although polygraph results were not admissible at trial under applicable state law, the 
evidence was nonetheless material for Brady purposes.  Bartholomew v. Wood, 34 F.3d 870, 
875–76 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 516 U.S. 1. 
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The Supreme Court held that the prosecutors did not violate Brady by failing 
to disclose the polygraph results.81  In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted 
that, under applicable state law, polygraph results were not admissible at 
trial.82  Since the polygraph results were not admissible, the Court held that 
their disclosure “could have had no direct effect on the outcome of trial,” as the 
defense would not have been permitted to mention the results during the 
proceedings.83  The Court noted that mere speculation that disclosure of the 
polygraph results could have led to the discovery of admissible evidence is not 
enough; instead, a Brady violation only occurs when the disclosure of the 
evidence makes it “reasonably likely” that a different result would have been 
obtained at trial.84   
D.  Conflicting Wood Interpretations Cause a Circuit Split  
Wood’s ambiguous holding regarding disclosure requirements of 
inadmissible evidence has resulted in three different approaches employed by 
various circuit courts to determine whether undisclosed inadmissible evidence 
can be the basis of a Brady claim.85  The Fourth Circuit has found certain types 
of inadmissible evidence to be immaterial and outside the scope of Brady’s 
duty to disclose.86  On the other hand, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits have held that Brady violations can occur when inadmissible 
evidence leads to admissible evidence.87  The Fifth Circuit has taken a slightly 
broader approach, evaluating the nature of the inadmissible evidence itself, and 
                                                 
 81. Wood, 516 U.S. at 8–9.  The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had held 
that the polygraph results were material under Brady because the results could have affected how 
Bartholomew’s counsel conducted and pursued investigation and depositions. Bartholomew, 34 
F.3d at 874–75 (“Had [respondent’s] counsel known of the polygraph results, he would have had 
a stronger reason to pursue an investigation of Rodney’s story.”). 
 82. Wood, 516 U.S. at 8–9. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 6–7.  The Court also noted that when Bartholomew’s defense counsel was asked 
about how helpful the polygraph results would have been during his cross-examination of the 
witnesses, defense counsel stated that, although he “would have liked to have known” the 
polygraph results, he did not think that they would have “affected the outcome of the case.”  Id. at 
7. 
 85. Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Wood did not 
clearly articulate a rule regarding Brady disclosure obligations where the evidence at issue was 
inadmissible and as a result “reactions to Wood have been . . . varied”); see also United States v. 
Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the disagreement among the circuit 
courts regarding Wood and whether suppression of inadmissible evidence that led to admissible 
evidence can form the basis of Brady claim). 
 86. See Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 87. See generally Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied,  
No. 07-4479, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18549 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2011); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559 (11th Cir. 2000); Madsen v. Dormire, 137 
F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), abrogated on 
other grounds by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev’d, 516 U.S. 
137 (1994), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006). 
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holding that Brady violations can occur when inadmissible evidence would 
likely affect the outcome of the trial.88 
1.  First Approach: Finding Inadmissible Evidence Immaterial 
In Hoke v. Netherland, the Fourth Circuit explicitely stated that inadmissible 
evidence is not subject to Brady.89  In Hoke, the defendant, convicted of capital 
murder connected to an abduction and rape, raised a Brady claim due to a 
series of undisclosed witness interviews that detailed the witnesses’ prior 
consensual sexual relationships with the victim.90  The Fourth Circuit found 
that no Brady violation occurred because the withheld evidence was not 
material exculpatory evidence as there was “no chance at all that the outcome 
of Hoke’s capital murder trial would have been different” if the evidence of the 
victims’ prior consensual sexual relationships had been disclosed.91  Although 
the Fourth Circuit did not explicitly rule on the admissibility of the undisclosed 
witness interviews, it stressed, citing Wood, that if the evidence was 
inadmissible, then it would be, “as a matter of law, ‘immaterial’ for Brady 
purposes.”92    
2. Second Approach: Inadmissible Evidence that Leads to Admissible 
Evidence Must Be Disclosed 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s explicit rule that inadmissible evidence is 
immaterial “as a matter of law,” many courts have held that inadmissible 
evidence can be the basis of a Brady violation.  The First, Sixth, Eighth, 
                                                 
 88. United States v. Lee, 88 F. App’x 682, 685 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curium). 
 89. Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1356 n.3 (stating that inadmissible evidence is immaterial as a matter 
of law). 
 90. Id.  Ronald Hoke was sentenced to death after being convicted of capital murder.  Id. at 
1352.  After exhausting his state court remedies, Hoke filed a federal habeas petition in U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  Id. at 1354.  Before the habeas hearing, the 
district court instructed the Commonwealth of Virginia to produce its files from the initial state 
court trial.  Id.  The files contained interviews of three witnesses that detailed the witnesses’ 
previous consensual sexual encounters with the victim.  Id.  Based on this newly discovered 
evidence, Hoke amended his federal habeas petition by adding a Brady claim.  Id.  The district 
court vacated Hoke’s death sentence and granted him a new trial.  Id. at 1354.  The Fourth Circuit 
reversed the district court, remanded the case, and reinstated Hoke’s death sentence.  Id. at 1365. 
 91. Id. at 1356–57 (noting that in light of the overwhelming evidence that Hoke raped and 
murdered the victim, no reasonable jury would have concluded that the witnesses’ “normal sexual 
intercourse” with the victim was material). 
 92. Id. at 1356 n.3 (indicating that the Virginia rape shield statute prevents admission of 
such evidence).  One commenter has characterized the Fourth Circuit’s view that inadmissible is 
immaterial under Brady as “the most restrictive approach” of all the appellate courts.  Gregory S. 
Seador, A Search for the Truth or a Game of Strategy?  The Circuit Split over the Prosecution’s 
Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpatory Information to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 139, 149–50 (2001). 
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Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held that Brady violations can occur when the 
undisclosed inadmissible evidence can lead to admissible evidence.93   
In United States v. Derr, the D.C. Circuit found that no Brady violation 
occurred when prosecutors did not disclose inadmissible evidence because 
there was no indication that the inadmissible evidence would have led to 
admissible material evidence.94  In Derr, police executed a search warrant for 
James Lanham’s apartment, where defendant Tyrone Derr was staying.95  As a 
result of the search, Derr was charged with possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute and firearm use related to drug possession.96  Before Derr’s 
trial, police executed another search warrant on Lanham’s apartment, found a 
large amount of cash, drug paraphernalia, and cocaine, and arrested Lanham, 
his brother Michael Lanham, and Chay Rawls.97  According to a statement by 
Rawls, the Lanham brothers and another person had begun distributing drugs 
from the apartment around the time of Derr’s arrest.98  The government did not 
inform Derr of Rawls’s statement, and Derr was convicted despite several 
motions for acquittal. 99   On appeal, Derr argued that prosecutors violated 
Brady by withholding Rawls’s statement, which was material because it 
implicated someone other than Derr.100  The D.C. Circuit found that Rawls’s 
statement, which was not subject to a hearsay exception, would not have been 
admitted at trial.101  Further, the court stated that even if the statement were 
disclosed, it was unclear to what additional admissible exculpatory evidence 
                                                 
 93. See generally Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied,  
No. 07-4479, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18549 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2011); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559 (11th Cir. 2000); Madsen v. Dormire, 137 
F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), abrogated on 
other grounds by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev’d, 516 U.S. 
137 (1994), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006).  The Second and Third Circuits have 
also similarly noted that inadmissible evidence leading to admissible evidence fits within Brady’s 
scope.  Maynard v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 392 F. App’x 105, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting 
Brady may apply when prosecutors withhold inadmissible evidence that could lead to admissible 
evidence); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that inadmissible 
evidence that led to admissible evidence is considered material under Brady). 
 94. Derr, 990 F.2d at 1330. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1333 (noting that the keys to a closet—where a revolver, Derr’s birth certificate, 
drugs, and drug paraphernalia were found—were in Derr’s room). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1335 (noting that Derr’s defense was based on the fact that he was in the “wrong 
place at the wrong time”).  Derr also argued that the prosecutors violated Brady by not disclosing 
physical evidence seized during the second search.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit found this argument to 
be without merit because “Derr’s knowledge at trial of the arrests combined with his failure to 
seek any information about the fruits of the accompanying search necessarily defeat this Brady 
claim.”  Id. at (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)) (noting that Brady requires 
disclosure of information for which the defendant does not have prior knowledge). 
 101. Id. at 1335–36 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
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this would have led.102  The court also noted that the materiality of Rawls’s 
statement was undermined by defense counsel’s concession that Rawls would 
have invoked his Fifth Amendment right if asked to testify during Derr’s 
trial.103  Therefore, the court held that the statement was not material and 
rejected the Brady claim.104   
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Henness v. Bagley, stressed that a Brady 
violation can occur when inadmissible evidence, which could lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence, is suppressed.105  In Henness, police created 
several “informational summaries” concerning the events surrounding the 
murder for which defendant Warren Henness was convicted. 106   These 
summaries were not provided to Henness before trial.107  Henness argued that 
suppression of the summaries violated Brady requirements because they were 
exculpatory and supported his claim that the victim was mistakenly killed by 
drug dealers who meant to kill Henness.108  Although the Sixth Circuit found 
that one summary was inadmissible hearsay, it held that such inadmissible 
evidence may form the basis of a Brady violation when it leads to the 
discovery of additional admissible exculpatory or impeachment evidence that 
could affect the trial outcome.109  However, the Sixth Circuit noted that the 
possibility that the inadmissible evidence leads to admissible evidence must be 
based on more than speculation.110  Evaluating the evidence in this case, the 
court held that Henness had not articulated a Brady claim because he failed to 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 1336 (observing that in considering the full spectrum of physical evidence 
presented at trial, disclosure of the inadmissible evidence would not have undermined the 
verdict).  This determination by the D.C. Circuit reflects the view that “admissibility determines 
disclosure” in the Brady analysis.  Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1331 n.51. 
 103. Derr, 990 F.2d at 1335–36 (finding Derr’s argument that the evidence was material to 
impeach a witness was vague and did not meet the “reasonable probability of acquittal” test). 
 104. Id.  
 105. 644 F.3d 308, 325 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the defendant failed to show that the 
hearsay could have led to admissible evidence), reh’g denied, No. 07-4479, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18549 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2011). 
 106. Id. (noting that one informational summary detailed a police interview with one of 
Henness’s friends, one described a conversation Henness had with police, another described a 
detective’s interview with Henness’s mother, and two described letters sent after the murder). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 324–26.  Henness pled guilty to forgery counts, but was tried on several other 
counts including felony murder, and was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to death.  Id. at 
316.  The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and the district court rejected his habeas 
petition.  Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 325–26 (finding speculation does not create “a reasonable probability” of a 
different verdict). 
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establish, with more than speculation, that the summaries would have led to 
admissible evidence.111 
Similarly, in Madsen v. Dormire, the issue before the Eighth Circuit was 
whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose inadmissible evidence of a 
chemist’s competency violated Brady.112  During his state criminal trial, the 
defendant, Michael Madsen, attempted to introduce a chemist’s serology report 
that indicated that the victim’s blood type did not match blood found at the 
crime scene.113  The court excluded the report after the prosecution introduced 
evidence, to which the defense had not been privy before trial, that undermined 
the chemist’s competency. 114   In Madsen’s habeas petition following his 
conviction of forcible rape and sodomy, Madsen raised a Brady claim, arguing 
that the prosecutors’ failure to disclose evidence about the chemist’s 
competency constituted a Brady violation.115  The Eighth Circuit compared this 
case to Wood and held that the competency information was “not ‘evidence at 
all’” because it could not be used to impeach any of the testimony presented at 
trial. 116   Further, the court found that Madsen failed to establish that the 
withheld inadmissible evidence could have led to admissible evidence, 
particularly noting that the defense presented no evidence showing that if 
Madsen had been aware of the chemist’s incompetence, he would have been 
able to procure another chemist who would have produced similar results.117  
Thus, the court held that no Brady violation had occurred.118 
In Bradley v. Nagle, the Eleventh Circuit articulated a similar rule, noting 
that nondisclosure of inadmissible evidence may form the basis of a Brady 
                                                 
 111. Id. (finding that none of the informational summaries violated Brady because Henness 
knew the underlying facts of the summaries, and because Henness merely speculated that they 
would create a reasonable probability of a different result at trial). 
 112. 137 F.3d 602, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 113. State v. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d 656, 662 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 114. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 603 (noting that the State, out of the presence of the jury, 
introduced evidence that the chemist had failed two proficiency tests in blood typing). 
 115. Id. at 603–04.  Madsen also raised a Brady claim on direct appeal, but was rejected by 
the state supreme court.  Id. at 604; Madsen, 772 S.W.2d at 662. 
 116. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604 (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (per 
curium)).  The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, which had granted the defendant habeas 
relief because “the State’s failure to disclose [the chemist’s] incompetency before trial ‘in effect 
eliminated valuable impeachment evidence’ [by] . . . ‘prevent[ing] [the defendant] from having 
the opportunity to procure an independent expert to test the samples.’”  Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604.  
Although the Eighth Circuit did not find a Brady violation, it refused to condone the State’s 
“belated disclosure of [the chemist’s] incompetency.”  Id. at 605 (noting that although criminal 
trials should be “a quest for truth,” Brady is not cure for all errors); see also United States v. 
Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1369 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Brady was not intended as a constitutional 
cure-all for errors in criminal trials.”). 
 117. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604 (noting that a more competent scientist likely would have 
uncovered that the crime-scene blood matched the victim’s blood).  See also Seador, supra note 
92, at 142 & n.19 (noting that Madsen’s approach regarding materiality of inadmissible evidence 
is based on the “mere speculation” test). 
 118. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604. 
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claim when the defendant can demonstrate that disclosure would have led to 
additional admissible exculpatory evidence and, when evaluated in the context 
of all evidence presented, would have undermined the verdict.119  The court 
also noted that there must be more than a tenuous link between the 
inadmissible and the additional admissible exculpatory evidence. 120   In 
Bradley, defendant Danny Joe Bradley filed a habeas petition claiming, among 
other things, that the government allegedly violated Brady.121  Bradley argued 
that three pieces of evidence were withheld in violation of Brady.122  Each of 
the withheld evidentiary items was inadmissible at trial based on state 
evidentiary rules.123  The Eleventh Circuit denied Bradley’s habeas petition 
because Bradley presented only speculative details about where disclosure 
would have led him, which is insufficient under Brady.124  In addition, the 
court held that no Brady violation existed because, compared to the entire 
spectrum of evidence that was presented at trial, the suppressed evidence 
would not have undermined the verdict.125   
In  Ellsworth v. Warden, the First Circuit held that inadmissible evidence 
may form the basis of a Brady claim when it provides a “promising . . . lead to 
strong exculpatory evidence [such] that there could be no justification for 
                                                 
 119. 212 F.3d 559, 567 (11th Cir. 2000) (evaluating a Brady violation involving inadmissible 
challenged evidence); see also Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703–04 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing now “inadmissible evidence may be material [under Brady] if the evidence would 
have led to admissible evidence,” which would have altered the trial outcome (quoting Spaziano 
v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1044 (11th Cir. 1994))); Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian 
Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 51 (2004) (noting that in the Eleventh Circuit, 
inadmissible evidence is within the scope of a Brady disclosure when it leads to admissible 
evidence). 
 120. Bradley, 212 F.3d at 567. 
 121. Id.  Bradley was convicted of the murder of his step daughter.  Id. at 564.  Following 
Bradley’s conviction, he unsuccessfully appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and 
to the Supreme Court of the United States.  See generally Williams v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 923 (1987); 
Ex Parte Bradley, 494 So. 2d 772 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).  Bradley then filed a motion for relief 
from judgment, which was ultimately appealed to, and denied by, the U.S. Supreme Court.  See 
generally Bradley v. Alabama, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).  Finally Bradley petitioned for federal 
habeas corpus relief, which was also denied.  Bradley, 494 So. 2d at 777.  Bradley appealed this 
denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  Bradley, 212 F.3d at 564. 
 122. Bradley, 212 F.3d at 567 (indicating that the withheld evidence included three different 
statements of other individuals who identified three different potential perpetrators). 
 123. Id. (noting that all three pieces of withheld evidence were hearsay and inadmissible 
under the Alabama Rules of Evidence). 
 124. Id. (noting that Bradley argued that he would have discovered evidence that the three 
other alleged perpetrators were involved in the murder, but did not go further in detailing this 
potential evidence or how it would demonstrate that the others were involved). 
 125. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit prefaced its analysis by assuming that the withheld Brady 
material should have been disclosed to defense counsel, but found that the district court did not 
commit error in determining that even if the Brady material had been disclosed, disclosure would 
not have altered the trial outcome.  Id. 
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withholding [the evidence].” 126   In Ellsworth, habeas petitioner Raymond 
Ellsworth was convicted of sexual assault.127  A Brady claim was raised based 
on an intake note that indicated, among other things, that the victim previously 
falsely alleged sexual abuse, and that the staff should “take special 
precautions” to avoid such false claims.128  The First Circuit held that although 
the intake note was inadmissible hearsay, it was also exculpatory.129  The court 
noted that despite the note’s inadmissibility, disclosure of the note could have 
assisted Ellsworth in identifying additional witnesses to corroborate the 
information.130  Thus, the court remanded and ordered an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the intake note would have led the defense to admissible 
evidence of false accusations by others.131 
3.  Third Approach: Whether the Inadmissible Evidence Could Have 
Affected the Trial Outcome 
In a slight variation from the approaches of the First, Sixth, Eighth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Lee confirmed 
that Brady may require disclosure of inadmissible evidence by examining the 
nature of the inadmissible evidence itself. 132   Instead of focusing on the 
potential discovery of additional admissible exculpatory evidence, the Fifth 
Circuit’s inquiry was broader, questioning whether the inadmissible evidence 
would alter a trial’s outcome.133  In Lee, defendants Samuel Lee and Jacklean 
Davis were convicted of extortion-related charges. 134   After their trial, 
prosecutors disclosed that the state’s main witness had an outstanding warrant 
                                                 
 126. 333 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (noting this decision is consistent with 
the policy underlying Brady). 
 127. Id. at 3.  Ellsworth worked at a facility “for children with emotional, behavioral and 
neurological impairments.” Id.  About one year after an eleven-year-old patient came to the 
facility, he accused Ellsworth of sexually abusing him.  Id. at 2.  Little evidence corroborated the 
conflicting testimony of the child and Ellsworth.  Id. at 3.  Following the state supreme court’s 
affirmation of Ellsworth’s conviction, Ellsworth filed for federal habeas relief claiming that 
prosecutors violated disclosure obligations under Brady.  Id. 
 128. Id. at 4. 
 129. Id. (noting the letter constituted “double hearsay”). 
 130. Id. at 5 (describing the potential evidence of prior accusations as “strong evidence” and 
“powerful” had it been disclosed). 
 131. Id. 5–6.  This holding marked a shift in the First Circuit, which previously held that if 
evidence was not admissible based on rules of evidence—like the rule against hearsay—it fell 
squarely outside Brady in all circumstances.  United States v. Ranney, 719 F.3d 1183, 1190 (1st 
Cir. 1983). 
 132. 88 F. App’x 682, 685 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curium). 
 133. Id. (noting that the proper test is whether “the disclosure of the evidence would have 
created a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different” 
(quoting Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1999))). 
 134. Id. at 683.  Both defendants were former police officers who worked as security guards 
at a promotional event and threatened to arrest promoters who did not agree to pay additional 
fees.  Id. 
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at the time of the trial for issuing a bad check.135  Both Lee and Davis sought 
acquittal and new trials based on this evidence.136  The Fifth Circuit, although 
noting that “inadmissible evidence may be material under Brady,” found that 
the defendants in this case failed to demonstrate that disclosure would have 
reasonably resulted in a different trial outcome.137  Further, the court noted that 
sufficient independent evidence supported the verdict regardless of the 
potential impeachment evidence.138  Thus, the court held that on these facts, no 
Brady violation had occurred.139    
II.  THE FRICTION BETWEEN PROSECUTORIAL LIABILITY AND A DEFENDANT’S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
Courts disagree on disclosure of inadmissible evidence because Brady and 
its progeny did not explicitly define “materiality” of evidence140—a key factor 
in determining whether a Brady violation has occurred. 141   The split 
exemplifies the friction between prosecutors’ obligations to determine what 
evidence constitutes Brady material before trial and subsequent appellate 
review of the appropriateness of such determinations.142  An approach that 
                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  The district court denied the Brady claim because the evidence (the outstanding 
warrant) was not admissible or material.  Id. at 684. 
 137. Id. at 685.  The court also explained that Lee had sufficient information to conduct an 
investigation of his own, which would have revealed that the witness had an outstanding warrant. 
Id. at 685 n.1. 
 138. Id. at 685. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 106–07 (1976) (attempting to define materiality in three different scenarios); United 
States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing Agurs and subsequent decisions 
that aimed to define materiality). 
 141. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) (holding that the petitioner failed to 
establish materiality of evidence because he failed to show a reasonable probability of a different 
trial outcome); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (utilizing tests from Agurs and 
Strickler to define materiality); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112–13 (explaining that the materiality 
standard must “reflect our overriding concern with the justice of finding the guilt” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Brian D. Ginsberg, Always Be Disclosing: The Prosecutor’s Constitutional 
Duty to Divulge Inadmissible Evidence, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 621 (2008) (discussing the 
implications of an admissibility requirement under Brady and noting that Wood is the sole 
Supreme Court case that “expressly addressed the role of admissibility in the materiality inquiry” 
under Brady). 
 142. See 2 DRESSLER, supra note 30, at 148 (noting some courts have criticized Brady for 
allowing prosecutors leeway to actually withhold more evidence).  Justice Thurgood Marshall 
noted the conflict facing prosecutors who must make pre-trial determinations of materiality in his 
dissent in Bagley.  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall found that 
the standard of materiality had essentially been narrowed by post-Brady cases that allowed 
prosecutors to take on the jury’s role of determining the effect a piece of evidence would have on 
the verdict.  Id.  He explained that when a prosecutor believes in the defendant’s guilt, the 
prosecutor may overlook or devalue contrary evidence.  Id.  In fact, Justice Marshall argued that 
instead of requiring prosecutors to disclose evidence that would definitely undermine a jury 
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encourages—rather than discourages—disclosure would be an appropriate 
solution.143 
A.  Premising Brady Disclosure on Admissibility Is an Inappropriate Standard  
The Fourth Circuit’s approach that inadmissible evidence falls outside the 
scope of Brady disclosure obligations, despite its exculpatory nature, 
inappropriately decreases prosecutorial responsibility and accountability. 144  
Further, this approach runs counter to Brady’s goal to promote disclosure and 
ensure a fair trial.145  Brady and its progeny establish that prosecutors must 
affirmatively take steps to evaluate whether evidence in its possession or the 
possession of one of its agents is exculpatory.146  It is inapposite to Brady to 
                                                                                                                 
verdict, the broader obligation to disclose evidence that “might reasonably be considered 
favorable to the defendant’s case” should be the applicable standard.  Id. at 702–03; see also 
Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for 
Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, 129, 143–44 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (calling 
Brady’s test “retrospective” because of the difficulty prosecutors face in predicting what evidence 
will be viewed as material after the fact and the reluctance of appellate judges to order new trials). 
 143. Bibas, supra note 142, at 142–43 (noting that this broad disclosure requirement will 
minimize “prosecutorial self-policing”); see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial 
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1610 
(2006) (suggesting that prosecutors are not well suited to evaluate the material nature of certain 
evidence because they may not be aware of defendant’s arguments and discussing the  
“bizarre . . . anticipatory hindsight” that prosecutors must engage in to avoid Brady challenges). 
 144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2011) (requiring prosecutors to 
“make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense”); Yaroshefsky, supra note 
49, at 1330 (advocating for disclosure standards that diminish prosecutorial subjectivity); see also 
infra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.  Courts can require broad disclosure without requiring 
prosecutors to disclose to defense counsel the entirety of his or her files.  See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
675 n.6 (stating that prosecutorial disclosure obligations are primarily intended to ensure a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, and are not intended to require the prosecution to help defense 
counsel obtain an acquittal). 
 145. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (explaining that 
prosecutors have a broad duty to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (noting that prosecutors seek to do justice rather than win 
cases, and thus should weigh any doubt in favor of disclosure); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (“[T]he 
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”); see also Bennett L. 
Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 701 (2006) (noting that 
Brady and its progeny center on the role of the prosecutor in ensuring defendants receive a fair 
trial). 
 146. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38 (holding that prosecutors must take steps to learn of 
exculpatory evidence); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 422–23 (noting that the “Brady doctrine 
imposes an affirmative duty on the trial prosecutor to investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable 
information”); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (finding that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory 
evidence to defense counsel absent a specific request); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (requiring 
prosecutors to disclose favorable exculpatory evidence to defense counsel); Discovery and Access 
to Evidence, supra note 5, at 360–63 (discussing that, although there are some limits regarding 
the evidence that must be disclosed, prosecutors nevertheless have an “affirmative duty to learn of 
and disclose any exculpatory or impeachment evidence”). 
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allow prosecutors to dismiss evidence immediately , without fully evaluating 
the exculpatory potential.147  The Fourth Circuit allows prosecutors to withhold 
inadmissible evidence that could lead to admissible evidence necessary to 
exculpate the defendant.148  The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit reflects a 
hard-line rule that does not require disclosure of evidence regardless of its 
exculpatory nature.149   In its analysis of inadmissible evidence, the Fourth 
Circuit approach is harsher than the views expressed in Wood, as the dicta in 
Wood recognizes that inadmissible evidence may have a role in Brady 
disclosure.150  In Wood, the Court noted that “other than expressing a belief 
that in a deposition [the witness whose polygraph results had been undisclosed] 
might have confessed to his involvement in the initial stages of the  
crime . . . the Court of Appeals did not specify what particular evidence it had 
in mind.”151  This suggests that the Court would have given more weight to the 
inadmissible evidence in its materiality analysis if the appellate court had been 
able to articulate, in a less speculative and more conclusive manner, the effects 
the disclosure would have had.152  Although discussed in dicta, the Court’s 
reference to the speculative nature of the inadmissible evidence reflects the 
recognition that inadmissible evidence may fall within Brady, as long as 
certain factors are present. 153   The Fourth Circuit misapplies Wood by 
discounting any potential value of inadmissible evidence and holding that such 
                                                 
 147. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 148. Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding inadmissible 
evidence to be, “as a matter of law, ‘immaterial’ for Brady purposes”); see also Seador, supra 
note 92, at 150 (noting that the Fourth Circuit approach is restrictive as it does not take into 
account any possibility that the inadmissible evidence may lead to admissible exculpatory 
evidence). 
 149. This hard-line approach is inconsistent with Brady, which requires prosecutors to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also, United States 
v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that prosecutors have the responsibility 
to seek out the significance of the evidence within their possession and that prosecutors may not 
“avoid knowledge that would lead to exculpatory material to avoid the Brady obligation”). 
 150. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (per curium) (finding the inadmissible 
evidence to be immaterial, not because it could never be material, but because the Ninth Circuit 
failed to articulate with specificity new admissible evidence that would have been discovered if 
the withheld evidence had been disclosed, not because inadmissible evidence is immaterial as a 
matter of law). 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. at 7 (noting that the speculative connection between the inadmissible evidence and 
any additional evidence it may have led to was insufficient to invoke Brady); Ginsberg, supra 
note 141, at 632 (suggesting that perhaps the Court in Wood would have found the inadmissible 
evidence to be material had a stronger link to admissible exculpatory evidence been 
demonstrated).  But see Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1331 n.51 (“In Wood v. Bartholomew, the 
Supreme Court suggested that admissibility is a precondition to trigger a prosecution’s Brady 
disclosure duties.”). 
 153. See Ginsberg, supra note 141, at 629–32 (commenting that the Wood decision is unclear 
on whether the inadmissible nature of evidence is the reason it is not material, and leaves open the 
possibility that “indirect effects [of inadmissible evidence] may be material”). 
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evidence is always outside of Brady obligations without requiring further 
evaluation by prosecutors.154    
B.  The First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and the D.C. Circuit Approach Holds 
True to Brady and Wood 
On the other hand, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have 
employed an approach that requires disclosure of certain inadmissible 
evidence, primarily based on the likelihood that admissible evidence would 
have been discovered and led to a different outcome.155  Under this view, when 
there is a sufficient basis to believe that inadmissible evidence would lead to 
admissible exculpatory or impeachment evidence, prosecutors must disclose 
the evidence.156  Although the circuits have reached the same conclusions, the 
focus of their holdings has been slightly different.   
For example, rather than strictly equating materiality with admissibility of 
the Brady evidence itself, the Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have 
focused their inquiry on whether there is a strong tendency for the evidence to 
lead to material, admissible evidence.157  In Henness, the Sixth Circuit rejected 
Henness’s claim that the undisclosed hearsay testimony would have led to 
information that implicated another perpetrator.158  Similarly, in Madsen and 
Derr, the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit concluded that speculation that 
the inadmissible evidence would lead to admissible evidence could not support 
a Brady claim.159  These decisions remain consistent with the language in 
                                                 
 154. Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 155. See supra Part I.D.2; see also Gershman, supra note 145, at 701–02 (noting that some 
circuits have “rejected admissibility as a precondition for determining the applicability of 
Brady”). 
 156. See supra Part I.D.2; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 677, 676 (1985)) (explaining that Brady applies to exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995) (applying the 
“reasonable probability” analysis to the evaluation of materiality); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 
(explaining that evidence was material “if there was a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). 
 157. See generally Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied,  
No. 07-4479, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18549 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2011); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559 (11th Cir. 2000); Madsen v. Dormire, 137 
F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), abrogated on 
other grounds by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev’d, 516 U.S. 
137 (1994), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006). 
 158. Henness, 644 F.3d at 325.  The Third Circuit has also explicitly underscored that a 
“concrete showing” of the probability that inadmissible evidence would lead to admissible 
material evidence is required for a Brady claim.  Maynard v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 392 F. 
App’x 105, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 159. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604; Derr, 990 F.2d at 1335–36.  In addition, the Eleventh Circuit 
elaborated on the Brady analysis when suppressed evidence was not admissible.  Bradley, 212 
F.3d at 567; see also Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703–04 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding 
similarily).  The Eleventh Circuit proposed an ultimate focus on whether the defendant received a 
fair trial.  Bradley, 212 F.3d at 567.  Thus, even when suppressed evidence was inadmissible, it 
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Wood, which notes that a Brady claim may not be based on the “mere 
speculation” that exculpatory or impeachment evidence would be 
discovered, 160  and are also consistent with the broader underlying Brady 
obligations to disclose favorable material evidence.161  By requiring that the 
connection between inadmissible and admissible evidence be more than a 
tenuous connection, the Court in Wood, consistent with Brady, Bagley, and 
Kyles, was concerned with the ultimate ability of the challenged evidence to 
undermine the trial result.162  The Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits applied the 
same analysis as Wood, holding that when the defendant is unable to 
conclusively articulate to what admissible exculpatory evidence the 
inadmissible evidence would have led, the Court will not find a Brady 
violation.163  
Similar to the Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, the First Circuit 
held that inadmissible evidence may be within the scope of Brady if it leads to 
admissible evidence. 164   However, the First Circuit imposed a stricter 
requirement: whether the inadmissible evidence itself was of such quality that 
it created a “promising lead” to admissible evidence.165  The First Circuit’s 
inquiry focused on the quality of the admissible evidence, questioning whether 
the chance of leading to admissible exculpatory evidence was so high that it 
                                                                                                                 
was possible to have a Brady violation.  Id.  A Brady violation based on inadmissible evidence 
occurred, however, only when suppressed evidence definitively led to admissible evidence and 
the strength of the evidence was considered in the context of all available admissible evidence 
presented.  Id. 
 160. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (per curium). 
 161. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 162. Wood, 516 U.S. at 5, 8 (finding that the inadmissible evidence would not have made a 
different trial result “reasonably likely”); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 677, 682 (1985) 
(finding that a Brady claim can be found where defense counsel abandoned certain areas of 
investigation, lines of questioning, and defenses); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 
(1995); see also 6 CRIM. PROC. § 24.3(b) (3d ed. 2010) (discussing that materiality under Brady 
and its progeny requires a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would have altered the trial 
outcome). 
 163. Wood, 516 U.S. at 6; Henness, 644 F.3d at 325–26 (finding that the inadmissible 
evidence was not sufficient to establish “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result at trial would have been different”); Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604 
(finding that the disclosure of the inadmissible evidence would not “have changed the outcome of 
the trial”); Derr, 990 F.2d at 1336 (evaluating whether the inadmissible evidence created a 
“reasonable probability” of undermining the trial verdict); see also 2 DRESSLER, supra note 30, at 
148 (noting that although the term “Brady violation” is used in reference to the disclosure 
obligation of prosecutors in general, technically a “Brady violation” occurs only when the 
suppression is significant to the extent that “there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 
evidence would have produced a different result”). 
 164. Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 
49, at 1332 & n.52 (noting that the First Circuit is among the courts holding that the threshold for 
disclosure is whether the evidence leads to admissible evidence). 
 165. Ellsworth, 333 F.3d at 4–5. 
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was improper to withhold it from defense counsel. 166   This heightened 
requirement is a shift from Wood, as the Court in Wood only stressed that the 
link between the inadmissible evidence and exculpatory admissible evidence 
must be more than speculation, not that it must be “promising.”167  However, 
as a whole, the First Circuit appropriately emphasized that where the 
disclosure of inadmissible evidence leads to admissible evidence, such that the 
disclosure creates a reasonable probability of altering the trial verdict, the 
inadmissible evidence is material and disclosure is required. 
C.  The Fifth Circuit Diverges Slightly 
The Fifth Circuit’s trial-outcome test in United States v. Lee diverges from 
the First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, and approaches disclosure 
of inadmissible evidence from a slightly different perspective than the 
Supreme Court in Wood.168  Instead of focusing its inquiry on whether the 
inadmissible evidence would lead to admissible evidence, the Fifth Circuit 
focused on the effect inadmissible evidence would have on the trial.169  In its 
Brady analysis, the Fifth Circuit approach does not premise materiality on 
admissibility.170  The Fifth Circuit analysis is in line with Kyles and Bagley, 
concerning itself with the effect on the outcome—questioning whether the 
inadmissible evidence creates a reasonable probability of a different result, 
such that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 171   However, Wood 
suggests that a materiality determination should not overlook where 
inadmissible evidence may lead in order to determine its potential effect on the 
trial outcome.172  Although the Fifth Circuit attempts to evaluate the ability of 
the inadmissible exculpatory evidence to affect the trial verdict, the approach 
may potentially allow prosecutors to discount the value of inadmissible 
evidence, if they are not also required to determine proactively what additional 
admissible evidence may be garnered by disclosure.173 
                                                 
 166. Id. 
 167. Wood, 516 U.S. at 8 (applying the broader “reasonable probability” test). 
 168. 88 F. App’x 682 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curium). 
 169. Id. at 685. 
 170. Id. (acknowledging that although inadmissible evidence may form the basis of a Brady 
challenge, the evidence presented was not sufficient to undermine the trial outcome, regardless of 
its admissibility). 
 171. See supra Part I.B. 
 172. Wood, 516 U.S. at 6. 
 173. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1330 (noting that prosecutors tend to apply a certain 
amount of “prosecutorial subjectivity” when evaluating evidence and may view certain items of 
evidence in a different manner than defense counsel). 
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III.  DISCLOSING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE: THE NEED TO ALLOW IN CAMERA 
REVIEW OR DISCLOSURE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Bartholomew did not overrule the 
obligations established by Brady and its progeny.174  Thus, when evaluating 
whether inadmissible evidence is qualifying Brady evidence, courts must take 
into account Brady’s underlying goals.  Although this consideration is apparent 
in most cases, it is equally apparent that some courts, especially the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits, have differed in understanding Wood’s holding.175   
Judicial guidance is required to address the difficulty prosecutors already 
face when making Brady disclosure determinations.176  Wood did not clearly 
articulate a rule regarding Brady disclosure obligations for inadmissible 
evidence.177  The varied interpretations of Wood demonstrate that another layer 
has been added to an already confused doctrine.178  The failure of prosecutors 
to adhere properly to existing Brady doctrine can lead to significant legal 
consequences.179  Thus, as the goal of Brady is to provide defense counsel with 
                                                 
 174. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556–57 (2002).  The Supreme Court “will not 
overrule a precedent absent a special justification,” and it did not do so in Wood.  Id. (finding the 
argument that prior Supreme Court decisions cannot be reconciled is insufficient when there are 
factual distinctions between the precedent cases); Ginsberg, supra note 141, at 621–22 (noting 
that Wood is factually different from Brady and is the sole Supreme Court case to elaborate on an 
admissibility requirement under Brady). 
 175. See Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308, 325 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the standard for 
Brady violations involving disclosure of inadmissible evidence must also be analyzed under the 
holding in Wood); United States v. Lee, 88 F. App’x 682, 685 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curium) 
(referencing the Wood case; however, not applying Wood to the materiality evaluation); Madsen 
v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting the case’s similarity to Wood); Hoke v. 
Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (4th Cir. 1996) (misapplying Wood by immediately 
discounting inadmissible evidence as immaterial); see also Discovery and Access to Evidence, 
supra note 5, at 361 n.1113 (discussing the emergence of a circuit split among courts evaluating 
Brady claims of inadmissible evidence and interpreting the implications of Wood); Ginsberg, 
supra note 141, at 614 n.3, 629 n.152 (indicating the lower courts that have applied Wood when 
evaluating Brady violation claims). 
 176. Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1325 (noting that “[a]pplication of the Brady decision 
varies widely across federal and state jurisdictions, and there remains a lack of clarity about the 
boundaries of its requirements”).  Another commentator has discussed how although Brady and 
its progeny aim to address the problems that can arise from defense counsel’s lack of access to 
critical evidence by attempting to equalize the positions of prosecutors and defense counsel, “the 
effectuation of such access has been problematic.”  Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory 
Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 
394 (1984) (noting that the main problems with the Brady doctrine arise from natural 
prosecutorial bias and the retrospective nature of Brady challenges). 
 177. Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 178. Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1331–32 (noting the circuit split regarding whether 
inadmissible evidence must be disclosed); see also Deal, supra note 51, at 1796 (stating that a 
great number of Brady challenges occur at the post-conviction stage of criminal litigation, as 
opposed to pre-trial hearings). 
 179. Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets 
Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1150 (2005) (noting that the improper application of Brady 
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favorable exculpatory evidence, clear recognition by courts that disclosure 
encompasses inadmissible evidence is consistent with this broad obligation.180 
In order to cure the existing confusion, an approach that combines the 
analyses of the First, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits should be 
followed.181  Circuit courts should require disclosure of inadmissible evidence 
if the inadmissible evidence does, or has a strong tendency to, lead to 
admissible exculpatory or impeachment evidence that creates a reasonable 
probability of a different trial outcome.182  Such disclosure is consistent with 
Brady’s underlying policy, as well as subsequent Supreme Court decisions that 
focus on a results-affecting test.183  Further, it provides prosecutors with the 
much-needed guidance in determining when to disclose inadmissible 
exculpatory or impeachment evidence and also recognizes defendants’  
due-process guarantees.184  
This proposal, however, requires a balancing effort to ensure that a 
prosecutor has the ability to prepare for trial, while also making a proper 
determination of materiality. Although this task may seem precarious, the 
constitutional rights of defendants must be given greater weight.185  To address 
these concerns, prosecutors should always be obligated to make a pre-trial 
determination regarding any evidence in their possession to discern the reason 
                                                                                                                 
disclosure by withholding favorable exculpatory evidence increases the risk of convicting 
innocent defendants); see also Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 146 (discussing the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct in 
the form of suppression of exculpatory evidence).  A clear rule is also required in order to 
mitigate the occurrence of prosecutorial bias, which is the natural tendency for prosecutors to give 
more or less weight to certain pieces of evidence based on the likelihood of the evidence proving 
or disproving the prosecutors’ theories.  Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 
IND. L.J. 481, 495–96 (2009).  Prosecutorial bias may cause the prosecutor to overlook evidence 
that defense counsel considers exculpatory.  Id.  If prosecutors were permitted to discount the 
potential value of inadmissible evidence, this only further limits the exculpatory evidence that 
may reach defendant. 
 180. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 181. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 182. Commentators agree that Brady disclosure obligations are not limited to admissible 
evidence, as evidenced by the Court in Kyles and its comparison of the Brady “reasonable 
probability” threshold with the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice “tendency” requirement, 
which it found to be less stringent.  Ginsberg, supra note 141, at 628–29; see also STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11(a) (1993).  As the ABA standards arguably would require a 
prosecutor to disclose more than what Brady requires, that disclosure also includes more than just 
admissible evidence.  Id. at 629. 
 183. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,  
421–22 (1995); Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1995) (per curium); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 677, 682 (1985). 
 184. Ginsburg, supra note 141, at 629. 
 185. See, e.g., Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (granting 
defendant’s right to access DNA evidence in order to conduct post-trial DNA testing and noting 
that “where the specified evidence is exculpatory, the defendant’s right to fundamental due 
process outweighs the State’s interest in nondisclosure”). 
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for their hesitancy to disclose such evidence to defense counsel.  If the reason a 
prosecutor does not wish to disclose evidence to the defense is because the 
prosecutor finds the evidence itself to be inadmissible and devoid of any 
potential exculpatory value, that evidence should be disclosed to the judge for 
pre-trial, in camera review186 to determine whether the inadmissible evidence 
has a strong tendency to lead to additional admissible evidence. 187   The 
prosecutor would then be required to evaluate the exculpatory nature of such 
admissible evidence.  In this narrow situation, the judge does not become the 
trier of fact, as the review is merely an extension of the judge’s role in 
assessing admissibility of evidence generally.188  It is crucial to ensure that the 
judge does not assume the prosecutor’s liability for nondisclosure.189   
                                                 
 186. Under current law, in camera review is within the court’s discretion when there is 
disagreement over withheld evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 
501 F. Supp. 796, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (conducting in camera review of portions of contested 
transcripts that the defense claimed contained Brady material).  Similarly, circumstances already 
exist in which the court may conduct in camera review of alleged Brady evidence.  For example, 
in camera review may be required when the prosecutor acknowledges possession of favorable 
evidence but wishes to challenge disclosure, or the prosecutor believes evidence may be material 
under Brady but is not sure, or the defendant has affirmatively demonstrated that prosecutors 
possess exculpatory evidence.  Capra, supra note 176, at 423–24.  In each of these scenarios, the 
court may conduct an in camera review of the identified evidence.  Id. at 424. 
 187. It has been suggested that the proper solution is to require prosecutors to turn over all 
inadmissible evidence, including all inadmissible exculpatory and impeachment evidence to the 
court to evaluate.  Seador, supra note 92, at 160 (proposing that as a blanket rule the judge should 
decide whether inadmissible evidence will lead to admissible, exculpatory evidence).  Under this 
approach, the court would review the evidence to determine its exculpatory and impeachment 
nature and determine whether disclosure to defense counsel is required.  Id. at 160–61.  This 
approach, however, is not appropriate because it effectively removes prosecutors’ responsibility 
and places disclosure obligations in the hands of the courts.  See Brady v. Maryland, 73 U.S. 83, 
87–90 (1963) (prosecutors must disclose favorable evidence to defense counsel); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-5.001(B) (2010) (noting that the 
obligation to disclose “material exculpatory or impeachment evidence” belongs to the 
prosecution). 
 188. It is appropriate for the judge to make a general determination of admissibility of 
evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (delegating to the court the responsibility of determining whether 
evidence is admissible).  However, it is not appropriate for prosecutors to request that the judge 
determine whether evidence is material and exculpatory.  See Stephen P. Jones, The Prosecutor’s 
Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735, 778 (1995) 
(acknowledging that although prosecutors may attempt to shift their disclosure burden to the 
court, courts are reluctant to evaluate evidence to determine if it is exculpatory); see also 
THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 2.1 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that 
in criminal proceedings under the Federal Rules of Evidence “the judge determines the 
admissibility of evidence”); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting, 
however, that the court cannot speculate regarding what admissible evidence the inadmissible 
evidence may disclose). 
 189. The important duty of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel 
stems from numerous sources, such as judicial decisions and ethical standards, which guide and 
complement one another.  Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1324–28. 
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If, on the other hand, a prosecutor is hesitant to disclose certain evidence 
because of its exculpatory nature, the prosecutor is responsible for disclosing 
the evidence directly to the defense if the exculpatory evidence is admissible, 
or if it is inadmissible, if it is clear that it will lead to admissible exculpatory 
evidence. 190   This requirement is consistent with the standard clarified in 
Kyles, 191  as it ensures that prosecutors remain liable, while protecting the  
due-process rights of the defendant.192   
This method would not be unduly burdensome on prosecutors.193  Requiring 
prosecutors to submit inadmissible evidence to judges, who then assist 
prosecutors in their ultimate evaluation of the exculpatory value of the 
evidence, merely clarifies judicial requirements and is consistent with existing 
ethical obligations with which prosecutors must already comply.194  In fact, 
such a requirement would aid prosecutors who carry the difficult burden of 
determining before the trial what value evidence will have at trial. 195  
                                                 
 190. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that when a 
prosecutor is unsure whether exculpatory evidence should be disclosed to defense counsel, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosing to the defense, or “at the very least mak[ing] it 
available to the trial court for in camera inspection”). 
 191. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) (expanding the prosecutor’s duty to 
disclose favorable material evidence to include a duty to learn of any favorable information and to 
disclose this information to defense counsel).  The expansion of the prosecutor’s duty in Kyles 
suggests that a broad disclosure obligation is the appropriate standard by which prosecutors 
should make disclosure determinations.  Deal, supra note 51, at 1794 n.83 (acknowledging the 
Court’s emphasis of broad disclosure in Kyles and Strickler). 
 192. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (finding that the due-process rights of the defendant were not 
violated with proper disclosure of exculpatory evidence); see also Sara Gurwitch, When  
Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in the Obligation to Provide 
Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 307 & n.19 (2010) (noting 
that prosecutors play a critical role in ensuring defendants receive a fair trial). 
 193. Potential negative consequences of an expansion to prosecutorial disclosure obligations 
have been held to include manufactured defense evidence or intimidation of witnesses based on 
early disclosure to defense counsel.  See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973–74 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 194. Prosecutors are already under ethical obligations to disclose Brady material to defense 
counsel.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.8(d) (2011); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE § 22-2.1(a)(viii) (1996).  Per these guidelines, prosecutors must disclose to defense 
counsel “[a]ny material or information within the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends 
to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offenses charged or which would tend to reduce the 
punishment of the defendant.”  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 22-2.1(a)(viii).  In addition 
to the ABA standards and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual details the obligation of federal prosecutors to disclose 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence and outlines components of that obligation.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-5.001(A)-(D) (2010) (setting out the 
purpose of Brady disclosure requirements, the obligation to disclose exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence to ensure a fair trial, and timing of disclosure).  These ethical obligations 
should be supplemented with the proposed judicial ruling regarding disclosure when the evidence 
at issue is deemed to be inadmissible. 
 195. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 49, at 1330. 
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Furthermore, requiring disclosure of inadmissible evidence would help reduce 
“prosecutorial subjectivity” in the prosecutors’ initial evaluation of the value of 
the evidence itself and help reduce any likelihood of prosecutorial 
misconduct.196 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Brady and its progeny firmly establish the prosecutorial obligation to 
disclose favorable exculpatory evidence to defense counsel.  In Wood, the 
Supreme Court rejected a Brady claim based on inadmissible evidence, as it 
was not material and therefore could not affect the outcome of trial.  Thus, 
there was no obligation to disclose.  This decision sparked different 
interpretations by various courts; some circuits held that prosecutors were not 
required to disclose inadmissible evidence, although other circuits, applying a 
range of approaches, determined that inadmissible evidence leading to 
admissible exculpatory or impeachment evidence must be disclosed.  A 
judicial solution that weighs prosecutors’ liability, defendants’ right to a fair 
trial, and the potentially prejudicial effect of disclosure of otherwise 
inadmissible evidence is required.  Courts should require disclosure of 
inadmissible evidence that leads to, or has a strong tendency to lead to, 
admissible exculpatory evidence that undermines the trial outcome.  Courts 
should require prosecutors to submit evidence to a judge via in camera review 
when the prosecutor decides not to disclose evidence because the evidence is 
inadmissible, and the prosecutor believes the evidence itself lacks any 
exculpatory value.  If the prosecutor contemplates suppression because the 
evidence is exculpatory or impeaching, the prosecutor remains responsible for 
disclosing this evidence directly to defense counsel if the evidence is 
admissible or, if inadmissible, leads to admissible exculpatory evidence.  This 
is an appropriate balance to ensure that prosecutors’ liability, defendants’  
due-process rights, and the underlying goals of Brady are satisfied. 
 
                                                 
 196. Sometimes prosecutors do not disclose certain evidence to defense counsel because the 
prosecutor does not view the evidence as impeaching, although defense counsel may find this 
same evidence to be favorable to his or her client’s case, and would therefore expect its 
disclosure. Id.  The subjective analysis of the value of evidence has been referred to as 
“confirmation bias.”  Burke, supra note 179, at 494.  Confirmation bias refers to the “tendency to 
favor evidence that confirms one’s working hypothesis.”  Id. at 495.  Professor Alafair Burke 
found that when prosecutors are reviewing evidence for a case, they will view evidence through 
this lens and naturally focus on evidence confirming, rather than refuting guilt.  Id. at 495–96.  
This focused evaluation of evidence may also lead prosecutors to evaluate improperly evidence 
that would otherwise fall under Brady disclosure obligations, including evidence that itself may 
not be admissible at trial.  Id. 
